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THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT FEES 
 






The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) established not only corporate governance reform but also legislated 
significant changes to the practice of auditing publicly held corporations.  Rules implemented by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) further reinforced stronger corporate governance standards.  The effect of these 
reforms on the cost of public audits is indisputable: the initial rise in audit fees was dramatic as corporations 
complied with the new provisions.  This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and audit fees for a random sample of 100 publicly traded corporations drawn from the 2005 Fortune 
500 list. The data is obtained from SEC proxy statements and annual report filings for the 2005 fiscal year.  The 
study examines characteristics of the audit committee and board of directors, while controlling for several financial 
measures generally associated with higher audit fees.  The corporate governance attributes include two measures of 
expertise (the number of audit committee financial experts and the average number of outside directorships held by 
board members) and two measures of diligence (meeting frequency of audit committee and board of directors).  The 
results indicate a positive, significant relationship between both measures of expertise and audit fees.  In addition, 
greater frequency of board of directors meetings is also significantly related to higher audit fees, while audit meeting 
frequency is not.  This outcome suggests that higher quality corporate governance as measured by fiduciaries’ 





The role of corporate governance has 
increased in magnitude since the passage of Sarbanes 
Oxley in 2002 (“SOX”) and new regulatory 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).  The legislated changes to the 
composition and expanded role of both the boards of 
directors of public companies and their audit 
committees stem from the “series of corporate 
scandals that raised concerns over the effectiveness 
of existing corporate governance standards” (White 
& Case).  The goals of the new rules are to enhance 
transparency, accountability and objectivity in the 
oversight by boards of directors and board 
committees. The hope is that achievement of these 
accountability goals will promote increased investor 
confidence in the financial markets for public 
companies’ securities.  
 
SOX mandated that the SEC issue rules to 
implement expanded disclosures about the internal 
controls of public companies. Corporations subject to 
the expansive reporting and attestation provisions of 
Section 404 of SOX have as a consequence 
experienced skyrocketing audit fees.  In addition, 
SOX has clearly set up a different environment in 
which boards operate. It has made board meetings 
more compliance-focused than in the past, requiring 
directors to delve “deeper than ever before into what 
it takes to fulfill their role as fiduciaries.  
Expectations of the board continue to grow and 
evolve, with the added pressure that directors must 
increasingly focus on their potential liabilities” 
(Eckbo, 2006). Likewise, the role and practices of the 
audit committee are experiencing a shift. Increased 
time and effort is now required of audit committee 
members to communicate with key organization 
personnel, monitor the internal audit function, 
oversee conflicts of interest, and ensure auditor 
independence (Lipman, 2006). 
 
Debate persists about whether the dramatic 
rise in audit fees is a onetime increase in the costs of 
compliance with Section 404 or whether there has 
been a permanent shift as a consequence of SOX that 
will create an ongoing environment of higher audit 
fees.  
 
In this study, I examine the relation between 
corporate governance and audit fees for Fortune 500 
companies since the implementation of SOX, 
including its Section 404.  All of the companies 
comprising the sample engaged a Big 4 auditor, so 
that there is no difference in the level of audit quality 
provided by the external auditors. The purpose of the 
study is to discern to what extent audit fees in the 
post-SOX environment can be linked to measures of 
both board and audit committee expertise and 
diligence. Prior research supports the notion that a 
board that is more diligent and expert “may demand 
differentially higher audit quality (which requires 
 
 
more audit work)” than would normally be demanded 
in order to protect the board’s self interest. (Carcello, 
2002) 
 
The number of board meetings that occurred 
during the year is used as a proxy for board diligence. 
Board expertise is measured using the average 
number of other director positions held by a 
company’s board of directors. Audit Committee 
expertise is captured by the number of financial 
experts serving on the committee. There is a 
significant, positive relationship between board 
diligence, board expertise, and audit committee 
financial expertise and audit fees.  However, unlike 
prior research findings, in which audit committee 
variables were not significant in the presence of 
board variables (Carcello, 2002), this study notes a 
significant, positive relationship between the number 
of audit committee financial experts and audit fees. 
This outcome is important because it indicates the 
growing impact of financial experts on the cost of 
audits. In addition, it is noteworthy that when audit 
committee meeting frequency rather than board 
meeting frequency is utilized as a measure of 
diligence, it is not statistically significant. This 
outcome differs from previous findings (Abbott, 
2003), and suggests the increasing role of the board 
and the positive association between its meeting 
frequency and audit fees.   
 
PRIOR RESEARCH STUDIES AND 
BACKGROUND 
 
Several research papers document the 
observed relationship between audit fees and 
measures of corporate governance. The 
characteristics of the board of directors can influence 
audit costs because in executing its monitoring duties 
the board seeks “to protect its reputational capital, to 
avoid legal liability and to promote shareholder 
interest by purchasing differentially higher audit 
quality” (Carcello, 2002).  In addition, the auditor 
may provide higher quality assurance services if it is 
understood that the board (i.e. the client) is 
“particularly high quality and demanding”. (Carcello, 
2002).  In their study Board Characteristics and 
Audit Fees, Carcello et al examined the relationship 
between audit fees and measures of board 
independence (percentage of outside directors on the 
board), board diligence (number of board meetings) 
and board expertise (average number of other director 
positions held by non-management directors). Using 
sample data for fiscal years ending between April 
1992 and March 1993 for “Big 6”- audited Fortune 
1000 companies, all three board measures were found 
to have a significant, positive relationship with audit 
fees.  
 
Further, the study examined separately the 
impact of comparable variables for the audit 
committee on audit fees, given its critical role of 
interacting directly with the external auditor.  Audit 
committee independence and expertise both had a 
significant, positive relation with audit fees, but audit 
committee diligence (i.e. number of meetings) was 
not significant. Interestingly, when the three 
measures of independence, diligence and expertise 
for both the board and the audit committee were 
included in their regression model, all three board 
measures persisted in having significant, positive 
association with audit fees but none of the audit 
committee variables were significant. 
 
In The Association between Audit 
Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees, 
researchers noted that “audit committees seeking a 
higher level of audit assurance could demand a 
greater level of audit coverage resulting in higher 
audit fees” (Abbott, 2003).   They tested the relation 
between audit fees and attributes of the audit 
committee using more recent 2001 sample data of 
“Big 5”- audited companies. Both audit committee 
independence (composed entirely of outside, 
independent directors) and audit committee financial 
expertise (at least one member with financial 
expertise) had significant, positive associations with 
audit fees, while audit meeting frequency (meeting at 
least four times annually) was not significant. 
(Abbott, 2003) These results were different from 
those of Carcello et al, because these audit committee 
quality measures were significant in conjunction with 
board variables included as control variables. Board 
meeting frequency and board independence were also 
statistically significant in positively affecting audit 
fees, although board expertise was not. Thus, the 
findings of Abbott et al expanded those of Carcello, 
suggesting that audit committee attributes can also 
have an impact on audit costs. 
 
These studies contributed to the examination 
of corporate governance measures and their influence 
on audit fees in a pre-SOX environment. However, 
the impact of SOX on the role and functions of both 
the board and the audit committee in the 21st century 
renders the results of these studies outdated.  
Empirical studies prior to SOX focused on the 
relationship between audit fees and audit committee 
characteristics (independence of committee members 
and financial expertise of committee members) that 
were recommended as “best practices” but were not 
required. These recommendations stemmed largely 
 
 
from the report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees, sponsored by the New York Stock 
Exchange and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers. Since SOX, many of these recommendations 
have been legislated, and public companies have 
reacted to the need to “restructure the board of 
directors and the audit committee to effectively 
undertake the new responsibilities assigned by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act” (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Evolution of Corporate governance, CPA Journal, 
March 2004). 
  
Several significant changes legislated by 
SOX and the SEC affect corporate governance. The 
first relates to independence: there are more stringent 
standards for defining independence and it is now 
mandated that all audit committee members be 
independent and a majority (2/3) of the board of 
directors must be independent. In addition, the audit 
committee also must have not only members who are 
all “financially literate” but also at least one member 
who is a “financial expert”, and the criteria for 
satisfying that role is more clearly delineated. Finally, 
both the board and the audit committee are much 
more empowered entities than they were previously. 
The authority and responsibilities of the audit 
committee have been augmented.  Among other 
things, the audit committee now determines the 
appointment of and compensation for the company’s 
independent auditors (previously administered by the 
board), and also must pre-approve all audit and non-
audit services provided by the independent auditors. 
As well, the board is now required to establish and 
disclose its corporate governance guidelines; it must 
also establish a nominating/corporate governance 
committee and a compensation committee, in each 
case composed entirely of independent directors. 
Further, the chief executive officer is required to 
certify annually that he or she is not aware of any 
violation by the company of the NYSE’s corporate 




The monitoring of the financial reporting 
process is of critical importance in the post-SOX time 
period, in which board members and their audit 
committees are being held to increased standards of 
performance. Given these conditions, it is fitting to 
examine the connection between audit fees and 
corporate governance characteristics in the context of 
this new reporting and disclosure environment. Four 
hypotheses are set forth below related to audit fees 
and the attributes of the board and its audit 
committee.  
 
Board of Directors Expertise  
 
Directors have a fiduciary responsibility to 
exercise care in monitoring management and to act 
judiciously in establishing and carrying out corporate 
strategy to maximize shareholder wealth. Directors 
who are involved in a greater number of boards are 
likely to possess an increased level of expertise in 
achieving these goals.  Furthermore, through service 
on multiple boards, they have invested significant 
time and effort into developing reputational capital, 
and will seek to sustain their professional standing. 
More experienced directors want to avoid legal 
liability and do not want to be associated with 
corporate failures or fraud, and therefore will support 
the purchase of higher than normal audit services to 
insure appropriate financial reporting and disclosure.   
 
Board expertise is measured by the average 
number of additional directorships held by the 
directors of the board.  Firms with stronger corporate 
governance through greater board expertise will seek 
higher quality financial reporting, which leads to 
higher audit fees and this hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between 
audit fees and board of directors’ expertise 
 
Board of Directors Diligence  
 
Meeting frequency is an indication of and a 
proxy for board of directors’ conscientiousness. A 
board that meets more frequently can increase the 
effectiveness of its oversight role by being more 
aware and knowledgeable of important corporate, 
strategic and financial reporting issues and concerns.  
SOX has added to the board’s plate the need to 
address SOX compliance issues, such that directors 
find “they are spending so much time with the audit 
committee and issues related to legal and ethical 
considerations” (Eckbo).  As a result, boards that 
meet more often can interact with the audit 
committee, and thus may influence audit activity and 
coverage during various stages of the audit, leading 
to this hypothesis: 
H2:  There is a positive association between 
audit fees and board of directors’ meeting 
frequency 
 
Audit Committee Financial Expert 
  
The audit committee is a subgroup of the 
corporation’s board of directors. Under SOX, the 
audit committee selects the independent audit firm 
for ratification by the stockholders, sets the external 
auditor’s fees, and reviews the scope of the auditor’s 
 
 
services. All audit committee members of publicly 
held firms are required to possess financial literacy, 
and must now include at least one financial expert. 
An "audit committee financial expert" possesses the 
appropriate educational background, prior experience 
as a chief financial officer and/or chief executive 
officer, understanding of generally accepted 
accounting principles and financial statements, and 
may also have membership on various audit 
committees. Audit committee members who are 
financial experts “provide additional support for the 
external auditors when discussing or negotiating 
auditing issues and/or audit scope with management. 
Such expertise allows audit committee members to 
better understand the auditing issues, risks, and the 
audit procedures proposed to address these issues and 
risks.” (Abbott, 2003) Thus, an audit committee with 
more financial experts can enhance the competence 
of the committee and the quality of its role in the 
financial reporting process. In turn, an audit 
committee with more financial experts will affect its 
execution of responsibilities to seek a higher quality 
audit from its auditors, which leads to higher audit 
fees, leading to this hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive association between 
audit fees and the number of audit 
committee financial experts 
 
Audit Committee Diligence 
 
Meeting frequency is an indication of and a 
proxy for audit committee diligence. A committee 
that meets more frequently will be more aware and 
knowledgeable of significant accounting, reporting 
and auditing concerns. With the passage of SOX, 
“the workload is more detailed, demanding and 
increasingly somber” such that “audit committee 
members must be willing to attend more frequent and 
longer meetings.” (Sweeney, 2002)  Thus, audit 
committees that have more meetings per year can 
influence audit activity and coverage during various 
stages of the audit, leading to this hypothesis: 
H4: There is a positive association between 





Two empirical models are used to test the 
hypotheses. The first model tests the association 
between audit fees and board of directors’ diligence, 






LNAF05 =β0 + β1 BODMTG + β2 AVGOSDIR + 
β3FINEX + β4ARPERC + β5INVPERC + 
β6LEVERAGE + β7SUBSID – β8SUBSID2 + β9TA – 
β10TA2 
 
The dependent and independent variables are defined 
as follows: 
LNAF05: Consistent with many previous 
studies on audit fees, the dependent variable is the 
natural log of 2005 audit fees (expressed in millions 
of dollars). 
BODMTG: Board of directors’ diligence is 
measured as the number of meetings of the board 
held during the year as disclosed in the proxy 
statement. 
AVGOSDIR: Board of directors’ expertise is 
measured as the average number of outside 
directorships held by directors. 
 FINEX: Audit Committee expertise is 
measured as the number of financial experts who 
serve on the committee. 
 
In addition to these test variables, a variety 
of control measures are used that have been found in 
prior literature to typically have a positive effect on 
audit fees. These control variables include: (1) the 
complexity of the audit, as measured by several 
factors: the proportion of total accounts receivable 
relative to total assets (ARPERC), the proportion of 
total inventory relative to total assets (INVPERC) and 
the number of subsidiaries (SUBSID); (2) the size of 
the client, as measured by total assets (TA); and (3) 
the risk of the client, as measured by total debt 
divided by total assets (LEVERAGE).  The SUBSID 
and TA variables are also squared (SUBSID2 and 
TA2), given the expectation that audit fees will 
increase with the number of subsidiaries and total 
assets, respectively, but at a decreasing rate.  
 
The second empirical model includes the 
same measures of board and audit committee 
expertise, but substitutes audit committee diligence 
(AUDMTG) for board of director diligence to test its 
association with audit fees.  AUDMTG is measured as 
the number of meetings of the audit committee held 
during the year as disclosed in the proxy statement. 
 
MODEL 2: 
LNAF05 =  LNAF05 =β0 + β1 AUDMTG + β2AVGOSDIR + 
β3FINEX + β4ARPERC + β5INVPERC + 









A random sample of 100 companies was 
selected from the Fortune 500 listing for the year 
2005. Fortune magazine compiles and publishes the 
list annually, which is a ranking of the top 500 United 
States public corporations as measured by gross 
revenue, although eligible companies are any for 
which revenues are publicly available. Only firms 
which were audited by the Big Four were included in 
the sample since prior research indicates that services 
provided by large audit firms have different price 
structures; that is, clients who engage larger firms 
tend to pay higher fees than those which obtain audit 
services from regional auditing firms.  A distribution 
of the sample, by industry, is presented in Table 1, 
and reflects that nearly half of the companies in the 




Descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the regression models are presented in Table 2. The 
average 2005 audit fee for the sample companies was 
$8.02 million. The average decline in audit fees from 
2004 was 8% with 68% of firms in the sample 
experiencing a decline in audit fees while 38% 
experienced an audit fee increase (not reported in 
Table 2).  The average number of outside 
directorships held by board members was 1.98 
(minimum of .14 and maximum of 5.22) while the 
average number of financial experts was 2.24 
(minimum of 1 and maximum of 6).  Board of 
director meetings averaged 8.56 (minimum of 4 and 
maximum of 26) while the average number of audit 
committee meetings was 9.47 (minimum of 4 and 
maximum of 22). 
 
A correlation matrix of the dependent and 
independent variables is presented in Table 3. Three 
of the test variables are correlated with the natural log 
of 2005 audit fees (LNAF05) with the average 
number of outside directorships held by board 
members (AVGDIROS) exhibiting the largest 
correlation at .40 (p-value <.0001). Among the 
control variables, total assets (TA) and number of 
subsidiaries (SUBSID) reflect the largest correlation 
with LNAF05 at .52 (p-value <.0001) and .25 (p-
value <.0108), respectively. Inventory as a 
percentage of total assets (INVPERC) indicates a 
surprising correlation with LNAF05 of -.49. Among 
the explanatory variables, the two largest correlations 
are (1) .34 (p-value <.0005) between the number of 
audit meetings (AUDMTG) and number of board of 
director meetings (BODMTG) and (2) .32 (p-value 
<.001) between total assets (TA) and the average 





Table 4 summarizes the results from three 
audit fee regressions. The Control Model regresses 
LNAF05 on only the seven control variables included 
in the empirical models.  Model 1 regresses LNAF05 
on the control variables and the three test variables 
related to board meeting frequency, board of director 
expertise, audit committee financial experts 
(BODMTG, AVGDIROS, and FINEX).  Model 2 
regresses LNAF05 on the same variables as Model 1 
except it substitutes audit committee meeting 
frequency (AUDMTG) for board meeting frequency 
(BODMTG). 
 
The Control Model, which regresses 
LNAF05 on control variables reflects an adjusted R2 
of .497.  All of the control variables are significantly 
associated with audit fees in the predicted direction, 
with two exceptions. LEVERAGE is positively related 
as expected, but not statistically significant.  This 
result is likely because the firms comprising this 
sample, despite their varying degrees of debt, are 
large, stable corporations; in addition, the 
incremental costs of auditing contractual debt 
obligations is not dramatically affected by the 
magnitude of the debt. In contrast, INVPERC is 
negatively associated with audit fees and statistically 
significant. This outcome is contrary to expectations 
and cannot readily be explained. This peculiar result 
differs from that noted in prior studies cited in this 
paper, in which a comparable variable was either 
statistically insignificant or had a positive, significant 
association with audit fees.   
  
Model 1, which regresses LNAF05 on the 
control variables and the three test variables related 
to board of director meeting frequency (BODMTG), 
board of director expertise (AVGOSDIR) and audit 
committee financial experts (FINEX) has an adjusted 
R2 of .53.  All three attributes reflect a significant, 
positive association with audit fees, thereby 
providing support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.  In 
terms of the degree of impact these explanatory 
variables have on audit fees, holding one additional 
board meeting results in a 3% increase in audit fees, 
while increasing average outside directorships by one 
results in a 14% increase in audit fees. Using the 
average audit fees for 2005 of $8.02 million, these 
effects are equivalent to a $240,000 and $1.04 
million increase, respectively, in audit fees. The 
presence of one additional financial expert on the 
audit committee raises audit fees by 8 percent, 
 
 
equivalent to a $642,000 increase. Thus, these effects 
are of consequence. The coefficients and significance 
for the control variables are consistent with those 
indicated in the Control Model. 
 
Model 2 regresses LNAF05 on the same 
variables as Model 1, but substitutes audit committee 
meeting frequency (AUDMTG) for board of director 
meeting frequency (BODMTG) as the measure of 
diligence.  This regression results in an adjusted R2 of 
.52, negligibly lower than Model 1. Both variables 
measuring expertise (AVGDIROS and FINEX) reflect 
a positive, significant association with audit fees; 
their coefficients are consistent with those in Model 1 
as are the observed results for the control variables. 
However, although audit meeting frequency 
(AUDMTG) has the expected positive relationship 
with audit fees, it is not statistically significant. 
Model 2 thus supports Hypotheses 1 and 3, but not 
Hypothesis 4. Substitution of audit committee 
meeting frequency for board meeting frequency in 
Model 2 sheds an interesting light on the greater 
relative impact of the board as a whole versus the 




This study is an initial effort to examine the 
relationship between various board and audit 
committee characteristics and audit fees in the post-
SOX corporate reporting environment. Although 
there is a limited amount of literature which focuses 
on the relationship between audit fees and corporate 
governance prior to the implementation of SOX, it 
was chiefly focused on only board of directors’ 
characteristics. This empirical study examines the 
impact of both board and audit committee factors on 
audit fees, using more current audit fee data and 
reporting disclosures, which reflect the impact of the 
SOX requirements and SEC regulations of the early 
21st century. 
 
The results support the theory that higher 
quality corporate governance as measured by board 
diligence and expertise as well as audit committee 
financial expertise is associated with higher audit 
costs.  Consistent with prior studies, it reflects audit 
committee meeting frequency is not associated with 
audit fees.  Of particular note, the results differ from 
pre-SOX studies because they reveal the influence of 
both financial experts and board expertise on audit 
fees, when both board and audit committee variables 
are included in the empirical model.  This signifies a 
shift toward the increasing influence of experts on 
external audit costs in the post-SOX environment.  
 
This paper is subject to a number of 
limitations. First, the sample represents only very 
large public companies so the results may not apply 
to corporations of smaller sizes.  Second, there may 
be other corporate governance factors not captured in 
this study which correlate with audit fees.  However, 
the analysis uses more recent financial information, 
examines audit fees after the implementation of SOX, 
and finds a concurrent link between audit fees and 
board and audit committee variables (board diligence, 
board expertise, and audit committee expertise).  
Thus, this study adds to the growing body of 
literature that finds a connection between several 
facets of corporate governance and the fees paid for 
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Sample Industry Distribution (n=100) 
 
SIC Code Industry 
Number of 
Observations 
1000-1999 Mining, Construction 5 
2000-2999 Manufacturing-Food, textiles, lumber, chemicals 26 
3000-3999 Manufacturing-Rubber, metal, machinery, equipment 23 
4000-4999 Transportation, Communication, Utilities 17 
5000-5999 Wholesale, Retail 17 
6000-6999 Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate  5 
7000-9999 Services 7 




    Descriptive Statistics (n=100) 
  Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AF05 8.02 6.67 0.89 33.77 
lnAF05 1.74 0.87 -0.12 3.52 
arperc 12.42 10.65 0.00 61.23 
invperc 13.65 17.65 0.00 80.38 
leverage 59.54 19.53 15.61 125.07 
Subsid 167.02 238.70 1.00 1,469.00 
TA 25,656.00 36,404.00 1,313.00 208,335.00 
FinEx 2.24 1.44 1.00 6.00 
AudMtg 9.47 3.77 4.00 22.00 
AvgDirOS 1.98 0.95 0.14 5.22 
BODMtg 8.56 3.62 4.00 26.00 
     Notes: 
   AF05 2005 audit fee in millions of dollars 
 lnAF05 natural log of 2005 audit fee in millions of dollars 
arperc total accounts receivable as a percentage of total assets 
invperc total inventory as a percentage of total assets 
leverage total debt as a percentage of total assets 
Subsid number of subsidiaries 
 TA total assets in millions of dollars 
 FinEx number of financial experts 
 AudMtg number of audit committee meetings 
 AvgDirOS average number of outside directorships held by directors 
BODMtg number of board of director meetings 
  
 




CORRELATION MATRIX (n=100) 
      (p-values in italics) 
        











lnAF05 0.11 -0.49 0.08 0.25 0.52 0.19 0.10 0.40 0.20 
  0.288 <.0001 0.4326 0.0108 
<.000
1 0.0586 0.3416 <.0001 0.0432 
arperc 
 
-0.11 0.08 0.05 -0.24 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 
    0.2781 0.4221 0.6207 0.018 0.9142 0.8685 0.8002 0.3179 
invperc 
  
-0.10 -0.10 -0.28 -0.07 -0.10 -0.28 -0.19 
      0.3413 0.3346 0.0043 0.4929 0.3381 0.0046 0.0543 
leverage 
   
0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.14 
        0.4825 0.9581 0.575 0.4395 0.4163 0.1672 
Subsid 
    
0.19 -0.02 -0.07 0.12 -0.01 
          0.0575 0.8264 0.4702 0.2183 0.8871 
TA 
     
0.16 0.04 0.32 0.18 
            0.1107 0.6881 0.001 0.0814 
FinEx 
      
-0.02 -0.05 0.02 
              0.8362 0.6448 0.8254 
AudMtg 
       
-0.17 0.34 
                0.0845 0.0005 
AvgDirOS 
        
0.00 






           
Audit Fee regression results (n=100)   *significant at 5% 
   
(Dependent variable = LNAF05) 
  
**significant at 10% 
   
             
  Control Model:   Model 1:   Model 2:    
Variable Coefficient 
t-
statistic p-value Coefficient 
t-




   
                  
Intercept 0.91187 3.43 0.0009 * 0.20745 0.61 0.5450   0.28984 0.82 0.4143   
AudMtg 
   
    
  
  0.01955 1.16 0.2473   
BODMtg 
   




   
  0.08460 1.98 0.0510 * 0.08592 1.98 0.0503 * 
AvgDirOS 
   
  0.14389 2.00 0.0481 * 0.15310 2.06 0.0421 * 
Arperc 0.02030 3.17 0.0021 * 0.02086 3.35 0.0012 * 0.01927 3.08 0.0027 * 
Invperc -0.01342 -3.44 0.0009 * -0.01074 -2.77 0.0067 * -0.01155 -2.98 0.0037 * 
leverage 0.00168 0.52 0.6064   0.00091 0.29 0.7748   0.00136 0.43 0.6698   
Subsid 0.00145 2.14 0.0352 * 0.00159 2.42 0.0175 * 0.00153 2.31 0.0231 * 
Subsid2 0.00000 -1.94 0.0556 * -0.000001 -2.18 0.0317 * 0.00000 -2.04 0.0440 * 
TA 0.00003 5.26 <.0001 * 0.000026 4.77 <.0001 * 0.00003 4.56 <.0001 * 
 
TA2 0.00000 -3.57 0.0006 * 0.000000 -3.51 0.0007 * 0.00000 -3.27 0.0015 * 
 
NOTE: Diagnostics on these regressions revealed that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
